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Abstract  
Corruption indicators have been used in budget support Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAFs) 
for a variety of purposes, including to control for misappropriation of funds, assess Government 
performance on fighting corruption, and in some cases act as an aid disbursement trigger. This 
literature- and interview-based study maps PAF corruption indicators and examines their role and 
effectiveness in monitoring corruption. The study finds that if corruption-related indicators are to be 
used in PAFs, it is important to: identify clearly budget support objectives and corruption indicator 
purpose; develop better outcome, rather than output, indicators; support partner country capacity to 
develop indicators; and work towards a comprehensive diagnostic framework for corruption. In 
general, the key message is to clarify the objectives of budget support and the purpose of including 
corruption indicators, and then select indicators that match. Where possible, exploit existing 
anticorruption processes and align PAFs with national anti-corruption processes, if they exist. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background: Budget support and corruption 
Budget support is a modality for delivering aid by channelling it directly from donor countries to the 
national budget of a partner country. Proponents of budget support argue that compared to funding 
individual projects and programmes, budget support reduces transaction costs, strengthens country 
ownership, helps strengthen country systems, and increases the scope for scaling up development 
assistance (Koeberle, Stavreski, and Walliser 2006). There is evidence that suggests that countries that 
have received large amounts of budget support tend to perform better against some development goals 
than those who have received little or no budget support, and that this is irrespective of policy 
environment, income status and aid dependency of a country (Beynon and Dusu 2010).  
Others highlight risks involved in providing budget support, in particular the risk that it is more 
vulnerable to misappropriation than other types of aid (e.g., International Development Department 
2007). In view of inadequate public financial management (PFM) systems in most recipient countries 
it is impossible to rule out substantial misuse of funds as funds are channelled through these systems 
(Schmidt 2006). However, evidence is currently inconclusive; there is no clear evidence that budget 
support funds have been, in practice, more affected by corruption than other forms of aid (e.g., Dom 
2007). 
Corruption is generally addressed in General Budget Support (GBS) agreements in two different ways. 
The first way is as a basic criterion for providing aid through GBS, and the second way is using 
indicators in a PAF to measure progress on anti-corruption commitments or priorities. This implies 
that even if there are no corruption indicators in the PAF, donors often do a prior assessment of the 
corruption situation to evaluate progress.   
Partly in response to such concerns, measures have been introduced to monitor the use of funds. One 
important measure is the use of Performance Assessment Frameworks. PAFs are agreements between 
donor and partner country governments made up of jointly agreed objectives, indicators, and targets. 
They set out areas for action and allow for assessment of the effectiveness of budget support. PAFs are 
used to monitor transfer of funds and some of the policy actions that the government pursues, as well 
as the results of these actions. In some cases, donors will withhold budget support or increase levels of 
budget support in response to the level of performance against indicators and targets in order to create 
an incentive for reform (Haider 2011). In cases where donors withhold support, the PAFs have acted 
as aid disbursement triggers. 
Various types of Performances Assessment Frameworks have been used. Lawson, Gerster, and Hoole 
(2005) outline three broad types of PAFs for GBS: 
• Common PAFs, sometimes called a Performance Assessment Matrix. This provides the basis 
for joint monitoring and management by GBS donors and partner countries according to a set 
of predefined principles.  
• World Bank Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC), used as an assessment 
framework, often supported by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that states common 
principles and outlines how consultations on the PRSC should be managed.  
• IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which is the primary basis for 
deciding on disbursements and monitoring progress of programmes and projects, often 
supplemented by specific conditions for certain donors. 
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Of these, the Common PAF seems to be the preferred choice for both recipient governments and 
donors. Lawson, Gerster, and Hoole (2005) argue that for recipient governments, common PAFs 
appear to: 
• Offer the best opportunity to maximise the number of GBS donors,  
• Reduce transaction costs,  
• Promote predictability in GBS disbursements,  
• Maximise effectiveness of GBS by focusing the policy dialogue on key reform areas, and  
• Foster strong partnership.  
PAFs agreed between donors and partners generally include indicators that relate in some way to 
corruption. These tend to have different areas of focus: 
• Macro-level indicators that measure the level of corruption in the country (e.g., Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index); 
• Individual indicators at a project or institutional level (e.g., the number of cases brought to 
prosecution by an anti-corruption agency); and 
• Budgeting indicators that monitor budget management processes which may be related to 
corruption (e.g., the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability or PEFA framework). 
PAFs are not exclusively used to monitor corruption but also to monitor a wide range of government 
policy actions. As PAFs monitor a large number of activities simultaneously this has led some to argue 
that countries are trying to perform too many functions simultaneously through PAFs (Daima 
Associates Limited and Overseas Development Institute 2005). One key finding of a major study on 
PAFs is around the “need to avoid an unnecessary expansion in the scope and complexity of the PAF” 
(Lawson, Gerster, and Hoole 2005: 7). The large number of functions for which a PAF is used also 
seems to act counter to the “good enough governance” approach which stresses limiting and 
prioritising governance interventions in countries with limited resources of money, time, knowledge, 
and capacity (Grindle 2007). 
Another criticism of PAFs is that rather than foster strong partnership, in effect they undermine 
partner country ownership. Most donors and partner country governments have agreed to the Paris 
Declaration that emphasises such ownership, along with alignment of assistance to host-country 
priorities. Although the increase in use of budget support can be cited as a key means to facilitate 
greater government ownership, it could be argued that budget support has come with more intrusion 
by donors in government policymaking, particularly through the PAFs’ increasingly detailed matrices 
of policy conditions and performance indicators. Donors come together with their own “conditionality 
shopping list” and the result is “the sum of donors’ wish lists – a jumble of different types of 
conditions. Despite the importance of PAFs, citizens and parliaments are generally effectively 
excluded from their formulation” (European Network of Debt and Development 2008: 20). 
In an evaluation of the European Commission’s general budget support programmes, the European 
Court of Auditors found (European Court of Auditors 2010: 33): 
It was often difficult to set appropriate targets for the performance indicators. 
Targets that are insufficiently challenging or targets that are overly ambitious can 
reduce the incentive effect. Moreover, reliable statistical data to establish clear 
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baselines and to provide information on past trends are often not available. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s documentation did not demonstrate that there had 
been sufficient analysis during the target-setting process of what reforms and 
additional budgetary resources would be necessary and feasible in order to achieve 
the targets. Since proposals for targets increasingly come from the country itself, the 
Commission has to hold in-depth dialogue with the national authorities to ensure that 
targets are not set deliberately low or unrealistically high [...]. In addition, 
occasionally targets were not set until well into the year for which performance was 
being measured. 
Despite these concerns, there is some evidence that the PAFs can be useful, particularly in “locking 
in” political will for reform. As Haider explains: “Indicators have been seen as valuable in acting as 
useful ‘signposts’ or milestones of the reform actions and timings necessary within a process of reform 
agreed to by the Government: ‘There is some evidence of such triggers/conditions helping to ensure a 
consistent and timely implementation of reforms’ (expert comments)” (Haider 2011:3). 
While PAFs are not solely there to focus attention on corruption, indicators may be included that are 
designed to address corruption issues. It is important to note, however, that not all corruption 
indicators are alike; though these indicators may seek to address corruption, different indicators can 
have quite distinct purposes relating to corruption. Common purposes include: 
• Monitoring: To assess levels of corruption and monitor changes in these levels. 
• Diagnosis: To determine the drivers of corruption and the blockages to reform. 
• Early warning: To identify areas and individuals vulnerable to corruption. 
• Awareness raising: To improve common understanding of the effect of corruption on 
development and promote fighting corruption as a priority of development programmes. 
• Coalition building: To build consensus and to strengthen and sustain political will for 
governance reform. 
• Anti-corruption programme progress: To evaluate progress of anti-corruption programmes 
and projects. 
• Research guidance: To identify areas to focus on for research. 
• Political and policy dialogue: To promote political/policy dialogue in relation to corruption 
and wider governance issues. 
• Fiduciary risk: To assess the risk that funds are not used for the intended purposes, do not 
achieve value for money and/or are not properly accounted for. 
• Programme failure: To identify whether corruption has been a contributory factor to 
programme failure. 
The inclusion of such corruption indicators in monitoring and evaluation frameworks can help donors 
control for the misuse of funds. Corruption-related indicators have been included in PAFs for just this 
purpose; however, what is unclear is how effective the indicators used in PAFs are. Donors take levels 
of corruption into account before deciding whether or not to disburse aid through budget support. It 
could be argued that significant corruption concerns should be addressed before budget support has 
been agreed, not leaving these concerns to the PAF to manage. Using the PAF to address corruption 
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concerns could arguably come too late, when donors no longer have the level of leverage they had 
before budget support was agreed. Of course, including corruption indicators in the PAF, linked to 
disbursement, is one way to ensure that donors retain leverage; however, using PAF indicators as 
disbursement triggers can also increase the volatility of aid which has been shown to undermine 
progress in governance reform (de Renzio 2011). Choosing corruption/corruption-related indicators 
for the PAF is, as we can see, not just a question of ”which ones,” but also "when” and “why,” or even 
perhaps “why not.” 
This issue paper therefore examines the role of indicators focused on corruption within PAFs for 
General Budget Support and their effectiveness in monitoring corruption at a macro level, monitoring 
anti-corruption projects or institutions, and monitoring budget expenditures. We argue that when 
developing or choosing corruption indicators it is paramount to match the type of indicator to the 
modality. There may be more appropriate places than the PAFs to address corruption issues and there 
are also opportunities to exploit and build on existing anti-corruption processes and align PAF 
indicators with these rather than seek to replicate these processes. 
1.2 Approach and methodology 
This study focuses on recent (i.e., 2005–2010) PAFs from six current or former GBS countries: 
Afghanistan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Uganda. To broaden the geographical 
scope beyond Africa, Afghanistan and Nicaragua were included. The choice of countries allows the 
examination of conflict-afflicted states, where concern regarding corruption is particularly acute, as 
well as countries that are relatively more stable.  
PAFs are not strictly bilateral, and in many countries, such as Mozambique, PAFs have been agreed 
among several donors. In other countries, PAFs have been agreed by a multilateral institution.1
This study reviews current and recent PAFs and key academic and policy literature to:  
  
• Map PAF indicators to identify which indicators have been used to address issues of anti-
corruption and public integrity; 
• Identify how indicators may have been negotiated; 
• Provide insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the indicators being used; and  
• Identify evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, as to their effectiveness. 
The analysis was complemented by: 
Telephone interviews with interviewees in donor agencies, multilateral organisations, and consultants 
who work on these issues to identify how indicators were negotiated, their strengths and weaknesses, 
evidence of effectiveness, and suggestions for which indicators work best to address corruption-related 
concerns.  
A review of literature and input from interviews to identify indicators that best address corruption-
related concerns and provide suggestions as to how the PAFs could be improved in this respect. 
                                                     
1 Including Afghanistan in the analysis in this paper allows examination of such a PAF. Afghanistan’s PAF was 
agreed through the World Bank and monitors the expenditure of a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. 
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Our research finds that the use of corruption indicators in Performance Assessment Frameworks is 
variable. Country PAFs tend to be negotiated and assessed annually; this makes it difficult to design 
indicators that are sensitive yet responsive enough to show changes in corruption levels over this time, 
in line with findings from the European Court of Auditors quoted previously. The difficulty in 
obtaining data about the PAF process has made it hard to provide clear policy recommendations. This 
is actually one of the most revealing aspects of this study: how little transparency there has actually 
been in the negotiation and production of PAF indicators.2
1.3 Structure of the paper 
 As such, we have not tried to make 
sweeping recommendations but have instead aimed to make some suggestions for improvements. 
Following this introduction (Section 1), the paper is structured in three parts: 
Section 2: Mapping integrity and anti-corruption indicators. This section looks at the role of integrity 
and anti-corruption in the PAFs and which indicators are used. The section also looks at the origin of 
the indicators, how these indicators were negotiated, the impact of this process on their clarity and 
level of impact.  
Section 3: Analysis. This section looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the indicators and how 
effective they are as a tool for improved dialogue between donors and partners. This section also looks 
at parallel anti-corruption processes and the relation of PAF anti-corruption processes to these. 
Section 4: Recommendations. This section summarises the key findings from this study and provides 
some suggestions for better developing PAF anti-corruption indicators. 
                                                     
2 This is something that came through strongly in our interviews as well as through our own experience in trying 
to find documentary evidence of the PAF negotiation process. 
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2. Mapping integrity and anti-corruption indicators 
This section reports the findings of a short mapping study to identify those indicators that address 
corruption within the PAFs of Afghanistan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
For the purposes of this mapping exercise, “corruption indicators,” effectively corruption-related 
indicators, were defined as those indicators whose objectives explicitly mention corruption.  
2.1 Origin of indicators  
The origin of corruption indicators was particularly difficult to determine. There is a general lack of 
transparency in relation to the development of indicators and a dearth of secondary material 
documenting the process. Different interviewees suggested different origins, including Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), regional norms based on the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM), and peer learning from other countries, though this was difficult to verify.  
2.2 Focus of indicators 
Despite the fact that PAFs are negotiated at the country level in order to ideally best reflect country 
context, there are some commonalities with regard to the focus of the corruption indicators within the 
PAFs of the six countries. As Table 1 shows, in the sample countries indicators relating to PFM 
(including procurement) are common across all the PAFs. Beyond this, other indicators common to 
more than one PAF focus on legal aspects of anti-corruption, specifically legislation and the progress 
of anti-corruption trials; transparency and accountability; and the role of anti-corruption agencies and 
the progress in establishing them. 
Table 1: Overview of corruption indicators in 6 countries 
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Public Financial Management  X X X X X X 
Legislation and legal processes X  X X  X 
Transparency and accountability X  X   X 
Anti-corruption agencies  X   X  
Perception assessments   X    
“Economic crimes against the state”    X   
Public Financial Management  
All six PAFs include indicators that address issues of PFM. These vary somewhat, but a common 
theme relates to the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework (see Box 1). 
Other indicators relate to building (often electronic) systems for budgeting, procurement and auditing. 
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Efficient use of budget support requires a good PFM system. Improvements in PFM can result in 
improved provision of effective services such as health, water, and education (Broadbent 2010), and 
countries with better performing PFM systems are perceived to be less corrupt than those countries 
with a poorly performing PFM system (Dorotinsky and Pradhan 2007). Though there may be some 
differences in the specific PFM indicators themselves, the use of PFM indicators in all six PAFs 
suggest that this type of indicator can, in principle, be agreed upon readily by donors and partners. 
This may be because of widespread use of PEFA and thus a degree of familiarity for both donors and 
recipients. 
 
Tools such as the PEFA framework allow both donors and partners to monitor the progress of PFM 
reforms. Such reforms lead to improved budgeting and expenditure processes, which help build the 
trust in government systems required for budget support to be supported by donors. At the same time, 
it is not clear whether inclusion of PFM indicators in PAFs have actually led to changes in the pace 
and quality of PFM reform and what the challenges have been to include PFM indicators in PAFs. 
Furthermore, as discussed in a later section, the connection between improved PEFA performance and 
reduced incidence of corruption has not been clearly established. 
Legislation and legal processes 
Four out of the six case study countries (Afghanistan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Uganda) had 
indicators related to legislation and legal processes in their PAFs. These indicators typically focus on 
the production of legislation to combat corruption and the progress of trials involving corruption. They 
also tend to include other de jure (i.e., written) provisions such as the production of monitoring reports 
and audits as part of their anti-corruption indicators. 
Strong anti-corruption legislation is essential for providing tools for the police and judiciary with 
which to investigate and prosecute alleged acts of corruption. However, simply measuring the creation 
of anti-corruption legislation is not enough. These sorts of indicators are in effect de jure measures 
rather than de facto measures (see Box 2), and there may be a great difference between legislation as it 
is written and as it is actually practiced. Legislative indicators such as these often fail to capture the 
enforcement of legislation; in other words, creation of anti-corruption legislation is relatively easy, but 
implementation and effective enforcement are not.  
Box 1: PEFA Framework 
The PEFA Performance Measurement Framework (known as the PEFA Framework) has 
been developed to assess and develop essential PFM systems.  
The PEFA PFM Performance Measurement Framework incorporates: 
• A set of high-level indicators that draw on international standards, and 
• A PFM performance report that enables the indicators to be read and understood in 
context. 
It forms part of an approach to supporting PFM reform, which emphasises country-led 
reform, donor harmonisation and alignment around the country strategy, and a focus on 
monitoring and results. This approach seeks to mainstream the better PFM practices that 
are already being applied in some countries.  
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Along the same lines, monitoring the number of cases prosecuted can be an ambiguous indicator of 
enforcement. An increase in the number of cases prosecuted could be interpreted as progress in 
enforcing anti-corruption legislation but could also equally be attributed to a rise in the incidence of 
corruption, or even a politically motivated drive against government opponents (see Box 3). 
 
PAF indicators, which focus on legislation and legal process, would need to monitor enforcement as 
well as written measures to be effective. The lack of legislation enforcement indicators in PAFs 
suggests that it remains difficult to develop such indicators and this is an area that needs to be 
addressed. This is part of a wider challenge to develop appropriate “outcome” indicators rather than 
purely “output” indicators. In relation to a programme or policy, output indicators measure the 
quantity of goods and services produced and the efficiency of production, whereas outcome indicators 
measure the broader results achieved through the provision of goods and services.  
It continues to be a significant challenge to produce legislative outcome indicators – indicators that 
monitor effective enforcement of legislation – and not just for the PAF. Whereas countries can draw 
on international conventions such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and 
the UNCAC Legislative Guide when drafting appropriate legislation, there are no universally accepted 
measures to monitor enforcement. In many countries, such as Uganda, where Parliament has passed 
six different acts focused on corruption since 2000 (Chêne 2009), there is not an absence of anti-
corruption legislation by any means, just an absence of clear and effective enforcement mechanisms. 
Box 3: Malawi PAF indicators – corruption case completion  
The Malawi PAF included indicators measuring the average number of months for corruption 
cases to be completed and the percentage of corruption cases completed within 12 months. 
It is questionable how well these indicators serve to monitor progress in combating corruption. 
The indicators only cover those cases of corruption that are prosecuted in the courts, and there 
may be other reported instances of corruption where those involved are not punished through 
the courts. There will also, of course, be instances of corruption that are not even reported, let 
alone make it all the way to court. 
The indicators may also create perverse incentives. It may encourage the government to reject 
complex cases, which could be lengthy and difficult, in favour of simple but trivial cases, 
particularly if it is clear that “success” in terms of the indicator is linked to a disbursement 
trigger.  
Box 2: De jure and de facto indicators 
The UNDP helpfully explains the difference between de jure and de facto corruption indicators 
in its “User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption.”  
De jure indicators measure the “existence and quality of anti-corruption or governance 
institutions, rules, and procedures, i.e., the de jure rules ‘on the books’.” 
De facto indicators measure the “impact of corruption on quality of life and public service 
delivery, i.e., the de facto deliverables of the governance system. These are difficult to precisely 
measure other than through proxy measures.”  
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It may not in fact be possible to identify a universal measure that can address all aspects of the 
enforcement of corruption legislation. Enforcement measures must be tailored to the specific laws 
passed. A potential indicator could be the production of a monitoring system that meets specific 
standards. Such an indicator would need to be designed in a context-specific way, informed by 
analysis that uncovers some of the political economy factors behind anti-corruption legislation reform, 
backed with increased support for de facto activities and covering a realistic timeframe.  
However, donors seem to exhibit a strong preference for output indicators – not just in PAFs – 
because they are relatively easy to use in order to demonstrate success. This is particularly true given 
the short timeframe of six months to one year in general, during which enforcement and effectiveness 
would be difficult to measure. 
Transparency and accountability 
Three of the PAFs (Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Uganda) include transparency and accountability 
indicators. These relate to the regular dissemination of financial statements and audits, as well as 
scrutiny of financial processes by parliament. 
Transparency can lead to lower levels of corruption, but this is contingent on other factors. Making 
information available will not prevent corruption if conditions for publicity as well as accountability, 
such as education, newspaper circulation, and free and fair elections, are weak (Lindstedt and Naurin 
2006). Where the conditions allow transparency, this can lead to stronger participation of stakeholders 
external to government in public spending, and countries with stronger participation of external 
stakeholders in public spending have lower corruption perception indexes (Dorotinsky and Pradhan 
2007). Transparency may not necessarily result in greater external participation but it allows the 
possibility of it. This in turn can lead to greater accountability and reduced corruption. In countries 
with an active media and civil society, transparency indicators may well be effective corruption 
monitoring indicators in PAFs, as they can indicate changes in levels of accountability.  
Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Two PAFS (Malawi and Tanzania) included indicators related to anti-corruption agencies (ACAs).  In 
recent years independent ACAs have become popular as policy and institutional responses to 
corruption, often being given a range of responsibilities to investigate and prosecute allegations of 
corruption, run public awareness campaigns, and/or develop and oversee anti-corruption reform plans 
for the government. 
Ultimately, anti-corruption agencies depend on a variety of factors to be successful, and the 
establishment of anti-corruption agencies may not, by itself, mean progress in anti-corruption reform. 
Likewise, ACA indicators, such as an increase in the number of cases handled by the commissions, are 
ambiguous in the same way an increase in the number of cases prosecuted in courts can be. The rise 
could be interpreted as progress in combating corruption, a rise in the incidence of corruption, a 
politically motivated drive against government opponents, or a combination of these.  
ACAs are ultimately only one of many institutions that help maintain effective safeguards against 
corruption. It may well be bad practice to only include indicators for one specific organisation in a 
macro-level monitoring framework, such as PAF.  ACAs are only one part of an anti-corruption 
strategy, and it is important for PAFs to include a wider range of indicators. 
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Perceptions 
Only one country of the six – Mozambique – included a survey of perceptions of corruption. It is 
unclear how this survey is carried out and by whom. Neither does the PAF contain detailed 
information about the survey, nor is such information readily available. In general, for macro-level 
indicators such as those usually used in PAFs, national opinion surveys may be a useful source of 
information, particularly if they allow for disaggregation of citizen views either by sector or 
institution, in order to provide more useful information on where progress is taking place and where it 
is not, particularly if specific institutions or processes are prioritised in the PAF or the GBS 
agreement.   
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World Bank Institute’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are often used in PAFs and similar monitoring 
arrangements, but are not as useful as more detailed survey data. These cross-country indices based 
mainly on perceptions data, though the WGI can be termed a “hybrid index” as it is based on a range 
of sources, which might not be categorised as perceptions. Such tools have been highly effective in 
terms of advocacy but are less useful for monitoring corruption within a country over time (see Box 
4). Perceptions of corruption can be slow to change; they can be biased by high-profile events and 
differ markedly depending on whether those surveyed are in the area or country in question, or 
external to it. 
 
In the long term, perceptions of corruption can illustrate where levels of corruption are believed to 
have changed. This would be more so the case if the data can be broken down by government sector or 
function. Including data based on experiences, in addition to corruption, along the lines of tools such 
as Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, could provide more accurate and 
responsive assessments of corruption.  PAF indicators that need to monitor changes in corruption 
levels over a relatively short period should therefore be based on experience data in addition to 
perception data. 
Box 4: Weaknesses of perception-based corruption surveys – Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
The Transparency International CPI was launched in 1995 and aims every year to rank almost 
200 countries by their perceived levels of corruption. It is a “survey of surveys,” bringing 
together expert assessments and opinion surveys from around the world into a composite 
index. As Transparency International points out, the CPI “has been widely credited with putting 
the issue of corruption on the international policy agenda” (Transparency International 2011). 
What the CPI is not, however, is a tool that measures corruption levels. It only measures 
perceptions, mainly of international business people, and so may be subject to significant bias. 
Although it can tell us an interesting story about how countries compare in term of perceived 
corruption levels, it tells us nothing about levels of corruption at the sub-national or sector 
level. It is not “hard” empirical data, and some critics argue that the data on which the index is 
based is often scant for some countries, making them problematic to rank (see Andersson and 
Heywood 2009; Sampford et al. 2006).  Even if one were to see the Transparency International 
CPI as “hard data,” it does not rigorously analyse whether the difference in ranking between 
countries is statistically significant.  
In short, the CPI is an advocacy tool par excellence, but should not be relied upon as a tool for 
measuring corruption, certainly not in isolation. 
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However, the issue of timeframe still remains. Perception indicators can be effectively described as 
“lagging indicators,” as they respond once the system has begun transformation. Perceptions of 
corruption/anti-corruption rarely change significantly in the six-month to one-year time period covered 
in a PAF, and so making disbursement decisions on this basis is problematic. Instead it may be more 
beneficial to identify what can be described as “leading indicators,” indicators that respond before 
transformation in the system (e.g., PFM indicators). Due to the relatively short time period which most 
PAFs monitor, “leading indicators” may be more suitable than “lagging indicators” such as perception 
indicators. 
2.3 Types of indicators 
Indicators may be generally described as input (i.e., the resources used by government to produce 
outputs), output (i.e., the goods or services that government agencies provide), or outcome (i.e., the 
effects on society of outputs from governmental entities) indicators. It remains a challenge to clearly 
categorise PAF indicators in this manner. In general, PAF indicators assess factors that would be best 
defined as outputs. An exception would be an indicator that measures perceptions of corruption, which 
is closer to an outcome indicator.  
Both a review of the PAFs and some interviewees suggest that there is a preference for output 
indicators as opposed to outcome indicators. Output indicators (such as number of cases prosecuted or 
the production of a management letter)3
2.4 Negotiation of indicators 
 may be preferred because they are easier to develop than 
outcome indicators and may be more suitable for shorter timeframes. At the same time, changes in 
output indicators may not translate to the desired anti-corruption outcomes. Furthermore, a need to 
produce tangible, quantifiable outputs risks incentivising outputs that may be of questionable value. 
Thus output indicators may not be the most effective for promoting meaningful reform, but their 
appeal remains, insofar as it is easier for both donors and recipients to claim success.  
This section looks at how indicators are developed and negotiated between donor countries, partner 
countries, and, in some cases, other stakeholders. Building on the principle of ownership, the process 
of agreeing on indicators should begin with partner countries proposing indicators to the donor 
countries. This is not always the case, however. Interviewees commented that partner countries often 
lack the capacity to provide suitable indicators, and the indicators are instead provided by the donor 
countries. A concern expressed by many interviewees is that indicators are based mainly on donor 
country concerns as opposed to being tailored to the partner country in question and its current 
political and social dynamics. There is little about the choice of indicators reviewed in this study that 
suggests otherwise.  
Corruption indicators are complex and expectations around ownership by partner countries, many 
which face severe capacity constraints, may be unrealistic. Where there is more evidence of country 
ownership in the choice of indicators (economic crimes against the state in Nicaragua, for example), it 
is clear that corruption indicators risk being politicised and that greater ownership may not necessarily 
                                                     
3 Common examples of this are workshops undertaken and documents produced that simply show that 
something has been done. Uganda, for example, has an indicator within its PAF relating to the production of a 
“management letter.” The “management letter” may be referring to a type of report produced by auditors that 
communicates deficiencies and weaknesses in an organization’s structure. There is little identifiable information 
about this letter and how it has been beneficial. The process of undertaking a special audit, however, seems to 
have been effective in highlighting issues of corruption. A special audit carried out by the Auditor General 
between 1995 and 2006 implicated the National Drug Authority of defrauding the government (UGPulse 2007). 
There are, however, few details about what makes up these special audits. 
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lead to better indicators. Rather than ownership (or a lack thereof), what the research suggests is a 
“scramble” for indicators, not an informed negotiation between partners for useable indicators 
appropriate to both the purpose and the timeframe of the PAF. 
Corruption indicators are often decided in addition to other wider-ranging governance indicators and 
indicators on other sectors, some of which are in fact designed with corruption issues in mind. One 
example cited in the interviews was an agriculture indicator that monitored the introduction of 
vouchers for fertiliser subsidies. The interviewee commented that the choice of this indicator was 
motivated by concerns about massive corruption in the allocation of fertiliser subsidies.  
This comes back to the issue of clarity in designing and formulating indicators; if it were not for the 
interviewee disclosing this information, it would be impossible to tell that this is in fact an anti-
corruption indicator if taken solely on its face value. Of course this is of concern for researchers, but 
the implications of this are not simply academic. A lack of clear understanding of the purpose of 
indicators can lead to them being miscategorised or overlooked when looking for anti-corruption 
indicators. This can lead to misguided efforts to promote anti-corruption reform or a missed 
opportunity to promote reform more effectively. If PAFs are to provide an effective contribution to 
addressing corruption issues, it is essential that the purpose and benefits of the PAF indicators be clear 
to all. 
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3. Analysis  
This section examines the insights from this study and provides suggestions for better design of PAF 
indicators that address corruption. 
3.1 Strengths and weakness of indicators 
In general, interviewees were overwhelmingly negative about the corruption indicators used in PAFs, 
and in many cases about actually using the PAF to monitor anti-corruption efforts. Several 
interviewees commented that unless there is political will on the part of the partner countries, attempts 
to conduct anti-corruption programmes are likely to fail. In the case of PAFs, the inclusion of 
corruption indicators was seen as being unlikely to incentivise partner country governments to combat 
corruption when there is no existing political will.  
As argued by an anonymous respondent in Haider: “A development worker, who worked on the 
budget support programme in Cambodia, finds it unlikely that indicators can act as incentives for 
reform: ‘The best we can do is identify reformers in the government, listen to their plans, and back 
them up with budget support. This is how the budget-support operation in Cambodia was designed’” 
(2011: 3). This raises the question whether PAF indicators can drive change. 
Many anti-corruption indicators in PAFs also suffer from a timing problem. PAFs are often revised 
annually. It can take six months to sign and agree a PAF, leaving six months to fulfil its requirements, 
and this may not leave enough time to meet those requirements. The length of time it takes to 
negotiate a PAF can make them an inappropriate instrument for annual monitoring, depending upon 
the indicators chosen, particularly as a trigger for disbursement. The timeframe of a year (and in some 
cases effectively six months) to meet the PAF indicators is very challenging, especially for developing 
countries with often limited capacity, though this becomes less problematic in the out-years of an 
agreement if an indicator is structured well with realistic milestones and targets. 
Choosing indicators that in fact measure changes over time – e.g., “lagging indicators” such as 
perceptions or the implementation of anti-corruption legislation – is simply not appropriate for an 
instrument used by donors to determine disbursement of budget support funds on an annual basis. 
Inappropriate indicators may be unfairly punitive for countries genuinely committed to reform.  
A third consideration when selecting PAF indicators is authority and responsibility for 
implementation. PAFs are negotiated between donor and partner country governments – each 
country’s political executive. The PAFs monitor compliance of the executive in relation to carrying 
out the agreed goals. However, some PAF indicators may address issues beyond the immediate control 
of the executive; for example, the executive may or may not be responsible (either de jure or de facto) 
for the action (or inaction) of local government. There is often a separation of power between the 
executive and judiciary; countries may lack sufficient capacity at specific points of the policy delivery 
chain, and there may well be bottlenecks. To be most effective, PAF indicators must not just take into 
account the will and capacity of the executive, but also the will and capacity of all institutions and 
departments that would be involved in helping meet these PAF objectives. Progress in indicators 
should be achievable; otherwise the indicator will not be particularly helpful. 
On the other hand, the indicators in the PAFs studied did not typically capture corruption at the 
sectoral or sub-national level and thus may not be able to deal well with corruption that can be multi-
faceted and multi-level. Donors tend to be predominately concerned with the link between corruption 
and public financial management at a central level, though corruption also occurs in line ministries 
when specific programmes and contracts are agreed (Scanteam 2008). This form of corruption could 
be facilitated or aggravated through deliberate misallocations of resources from where they are most 
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needed towards ministries or systems that provide the greatest opportunity for corruption. However, as 
an interviewee noted, this would be difficult for a few indicators to capture. Furthermore, PAFs are 
criticised for being too complicated, taking on too many functions simultaneously (Daima Associates 
Limited and Overseas Development Institute 2005), and attempting to address these issues may well 
add a further layer of complication. In short, while sector-specific and disaggregated data may be 
valuable, the capacity and authority of counterparts to monitor this level of complexity must be a 
consideration when agreeing PAF indicators. 
Wider governance reform, especially public finance management reform indicators, can give an 
indication of vulnerability to corruption in the public sector. However, the relationship between PFM 
reform and corruption is not clear. How do changes in PFM lead to a reduced perception or frequency 
of corruption, and which changes to PFM are most important? A stronger theory identifying the 
underlying process between wider corruption and PFM reform is needed. It is also unclear how PFM 
indicators, which are generally on a national level, would work together with other indicators, some of 
which may work at a sectoral or sub-national level. As it stands, current PFM indicators can tell us 
little about the wider corruption level.  
While PFM indicators should not be used as proxies for measuring overall corruption levels, they may 
still be useful as a reflection of progress on specific elements of an anti-corruption reform agenda. In 
this context, PAFs could usefully incorporate either specific PEFA indicators or focus on a composite 
rating.  Where there is an existing PEFA review process, it would be preferable to have a PAF 
indicator related to achievable progress in this PEFA process. Doing so would incorporate, rather than 
duplicate, the existing PEFA process and would be overall less onerous for the host government. 
3.2 Donor-partner dialogue 
The majority of individuals interviewed in this study criticised current PAF corruption indicators as 
unlikely to improve donor-partner dialogue.  
One interviewee noted that there can often be “split assessments” – a disagreement between donors 
and partners over whether or not general PAF indicators have been achieved: partner countries may 
believe they have been met, whereas donor countries believe that they have not. If indicators are not 
clear, and if the process for agreeing them is not transparent and progress in them is open to 
interpretation, then this suggests the indicators have been poorly constructed. Several interviewees 
also commented that the PAF is seen as having become too rigid in relation to donor priorities. Donor 
demands are prioritised over partner country needs resulting in PAFs that are unresponsive to the 
partner country context.  
PAFs were criticised for being surprisingly difficult to get hold of and rarely published. One 
interviewee commented that greater transparency would lead to a healthier discussion between donors, 
governments and civil society about government reform commitments, and may also be helpful for 
donors to be able to show greater accountability towards domestic taxpayers. Lack of transparency 
makes external review of PAFs and budget support in general extremely difficult, with neither 
governments nor donors able to be held to account. The trust required for budget support to be 
successful is not just trust between recipient and donor; it is also important for the public in donor 
countries to believe that aid money is being well-directed and well-spent. If academics, civil society, 
advocacy groups, and so on cannot examine the PAFs, their effectiveness as a tool may be 
questionable. 
This finding is supported by a study on the GBS process in Tanzania. Claussen and Martinsen find 
that the dialogue was “characterised by a process in which Development Partners have been ‘auditing’ 
and ‘assessing’ Government performance based on limited information and empirical evidence leading 
to a situation of mistrust on what is the real agenda for the ‘dialogue’” (2011: 34). The authors 
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therefore recommend establishing independent review panels to conduct the monitoring, where 
representatives from government, civil society, private sector, and academia are included, and that 
assessments are openly published. Where possible this process should be based on existing 
mechanisms, such as those already established in connection with compliance for international 
conventions. 
Interviewees commented that when certain PAF indicators have not been met, tranches of funding 
have been withheld or disbursements have been delayed. They also suggested that this did not affect 
underlying government behaviour in relation to corruption. In other cases, even where PAF goals have 
been met in relation to corruption indicators, funding may still be cut off following a well-publicised 
incident. The case of Uganda was cited by one interviewee, where the British government cut over 
£7.5 million in direct aid to Uganda, citing slow progress in punishing ministers and other public 
officials accused of misappropriating funds in relation to the 2007 Commonwealth Summit (Mugerwa 
2010). 
One interviewee criticised the proliferation of governmental working groups relating to PAFs. 
Mozambique is reported to have 71 working groups working on the Mozambique PAF. Following 
suggestions that this should be streamlined, two further working groups were created to look at the 
streamlining process. This suggests that the production of PAFs and PAF indicators can become a 
bureaucratic and resource-intensive process. This could help explain why, as one interviewee 
commented, PAFs often take six months to develop, leaving only six months to demonstrate results. 
Another comment was that useful dialogue about corruption often takes place in private and that the 
real issues that drive corruption are not and cannot be assessed at the PAF level. The interviewee 
commented that a better understanding of the political economy is critical when working on 
addressing corruption.4
3.3 Parallel anti-corruption processes 
 Donor countries cannot generate sustained political will and an environment 
amenable to reform in partner countries where none exists initially. Effective anti-corruption reform 
efforts will have to take political economy dynamics into account. In the same manner, anti-corruption 
monitoring within PAFs must “work with the grain” of the partner country and be aligned with its 
political economy dynamics to be effective. 
In most countries, a number of anti-corruption processes occur in parallel to those included in the PAF 
monitoring process. Many countries have national anti-corruption strategies, some of which are also 
linked to PRSPs. Regional initiatives may also call for anti-corruption reforms. In Africa, for example, 
the New Partnership for Africa's Development’s (NEPAD) African Peer Review Mechanism includes 
monitoring of government anti-corruption activities.5
                                                     
4 A U4 Issue Paper, based on a study of India, Bangladesh, and Kenya, also emphasises the primacy of political 
economy when attempting to institute anti-corruption reform (Hechler et al. 2011). In the three countries 
examined in the study, gap analyses showed that there were comparatively solid institutional and legal anti-
corruption frameworks in all three countries but generally poor enforcement of this legislation. The authors find 
that this lack of enforcement is attributable to political economy factors – the structure or shifts in political 
dynamics. Such factors include the weakening of political leadership, the lack of political commitment, 
constraints relating to coalition governments, and the effect of other competing policy agendas.  
 These processes may reinforce each other, or 
they may have significantly different aims. Consequently, the indicators used may have markedly 
different purposes (e.g., monitoring, diagnosis, fiduciary risk, political dialogue). 
5 The APRM is a voluntary mechanism that encourages participating states to ensure that their policies and 
practices conform to agreed values including democracy and political governance values, and economic 
governance and management values. 
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The United Nations Convention against Corruption is a global instrument that requires a wide range of 
anti-corruption actions and reforms of signatory governments.6 As a broadly accepted framework, it 
has attracted the attention of many donor and aid-recipient countries as an attractive basis for agreeing 
on anti-corruption priorities. A self-assessment checklist, developed to help States Parties and 
signatories gather information and report on progress7
The UNCAC and its implementation review tools, as global frameworks, are not context-specific. It 
directs states to assess their own compliance with the wide range of standards set out in the 
Convention, but the Convention sets no priorities across its many provisions, nor does it provide tools 
for evaluating the feasibility and timeliness of different reforms for any given country. PAFs, on the 
other hand, must be context-specific, setting objectives and reforms, which are feasible for the partner 
country over a given period of time. Consequently, it may not be feasible to develop PAF indicators 
directly from the UNCAC, though a country may use the UNCAC as the basis to undertake a gap 
analysis or priority-setting initiative that might take local conditions and priorities into account more 
effectively.
 has been seen by many in the anti-corruption 
field as a promising tool for monitoring, but it is important to recognise the limitations of this 
framework. 
8
Similarly, some national anti-corruption strategies, which are more context-specific, could lend 
themselves to be used as a source of indicators. The implementation of an anti-corruption strategy 
usually is assessed via many different indicators, more than can be included in a PAF. Therefore, the 
best strategy may be to develop some sort of composite indicator for the PAF that could be used to 
monitor progress in implementing anti-corruption strategies outlined in parallel processes such as in 
UNCAC, the APRM or national strategies. As Lawson, Gerster, and Hoole (2005: 7) argue: “The need 
to recognise that the PAF should be only one component within a coordinated sequence of processes 
for performance reviews and policy dialogue represents [a key] challenge.”  
 
3.4 Understanding the pitfalls of corruption indicators 
It is important to note the limitations of PAF indicators in measuring corruption. The PAFs themselves 
have been criticised for trying to undertake too many functions and consequently having too many 
indicators. A PAF is essentially a macro-level tool that is more often used to measure outputs and de 
jure changes, as opposed to outcomes and de facto changes. Corruption indicators are one type of 
governance indicator, which themselves have limitations. When used inappropriately, governance 
indicators can obscure more than they reveal, promote false assumptions about what drives progress in 
governance and development, and at worst lead to the wrong policy or investment choices (Williams 
2011). 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that corruption is, by virtue of its “illicit” or “clandestine” nature, 
difficult to measure. Participants do not want it reported, and these people could include civil servants 
who have the power to distort numbers. Measuring corruption is likely to be a challenge, and 
significantly more difficult than monitoring other things that are included in the PAF, where there is 
less incentive for distorting the facts. 
                                                     
6 To date, the convention has been ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to by 154 countries, which includes 
nearly all donor countries and partner countries.   
7 See the documents at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/IRG.html. 
8 See the discussions of UNCAC gap analyses in Hechler et al. 2011. 
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4. Recommendations 
Corruption in an important development concern, and thus it is not surprising that donors wish to 
address the issue in PAF frameworks. They question is how to do so. This study has examined the 
ways in which anti-corruption objectives have been addressed through PAF indicators. Corruption-
related indicators across the six countries varied in focus, and with the exception of those indicators 
that addressed issues already covered by public financial management tools such as PEFA, there was 
no common focus. Interviewees who had experience with the PAFs expressed the general view that 
the indicators were weak and not fit for macro-level monitoring. 
There is no robust evidence to suggest that PAFs provide sufficient incentive or leverage to reduce 
corruption in partner countries (Haider 2011). However, once a decision has been made to use budget 
support in a partner country, this signals an existing degree of confidence in a partner country’s 
systems and political commitment to implement reforms. At this stage PAFs can be used to monitor 
whether some aspects of corruption or the conditions that contribute to corruption, are getting better or 
worse, though this is most likely to work best in conjunction with other wider anti-corruption 
strategies. 
Keeping in mind the overall challenges in measuring corruption or anti-corruption progress, if 
corruption and corruption-related indicators are to be used in PAFs, some fairly simple steps can help 
improve on current practice. In terms of developing indicators for PAFs some suggestions include: 
• Identify the objectives of budget support and the purpose of corruption indicators 
There is no clear, universally accepted statement of the objectives of budget support. PAF 
indicators reflect this ambiguity and can be poorly targeted as a consequence. Lawson, 
Gerster, and Hoole (2005) outline six possible objectives for budget support more generally: i) 
to provide predictable increases in budget funding for partner governments; ii) to promote 
ownership by partner governments; iii) to accelerate national development and reform 
processes in partner governments; iv) to improve the effectiveness of partner governments in 
achieving positive service delivery outcomes; v) to strengthen national systems of planning, 
budgeting, control, and oversight; and vi) to reduce the transaction costs associated with 
external finance. While some of these objectives may not require corruption indicators at all, 
others would influence the choice of indicators significantly. For example, a GBS agreement 
focused on improving service delivery might prompt a corruption indicator focused on 
measuring leakage from a service sector budget. Alternatively, a focus on accelerating 
national reform processes might call for use of a series of qualitative milestones toward 
achieving an agreed reform. 
At the same time, donors may have different objectives specifically related to monitoring 
corruption in a PAF. If the purpose of a corruption-related indicator were to monitor overall 
corruption levels, for example, then victimisation or experience-based indicators would be 
preferable. However, if the purpose is to monitor progress on specific anti-corruption activities 
or initiatives, then qualitative milestones might be better indicators. The distinction between 
threshold or corruption-level monitoring on the one hand, and progress monitoring on the 
other, is important to have in mind. 
• Develop better outcome, rather than output, indicators 
Many corruption indicators – not just the ones found in the PAFs under study here – are 
output-focused, such as the number of prosecutions for corruption or the establishment of anti-
corruption bodies. Such indicators may be easier to measure than outcome indicators, and may 
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be more appropriate for the timeframe covered by the PAF, but cannot clearly reflect changes 
in levels of corruption. One country (Mozambique) did have an outcome-focused indicator – a 
survey of corruption perceptions of citizens. This is arguably a stronger indicator than output-
focused indicators but is not appropriate for use in a PAF, especially not as a disbursement 
trigger, as it can take several years for perceptions to show meaningful change. A better 
indicator would focus on measures which are within the government’s sphere of influence, 
and where measurement is not dependent on long-term societal changes. An example could be 
whether public officials are less prone to demand bribes (measured by sector-specific public 
opinion polls, such as Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer), or whether 
service delivery is not undermined by corruption (measured by for example the World Bank’s 
Quantitative Service Delivery Surveys).  
• Support partner country capacity to develop indicators 
The interviews about the negotiation process for PAFs suggest that in many cases, partner 
country input was limited. This may be due, at least in part, to partner country capacity 
constraints. Donor countries often take the lead in providing indicators even though they 
themselves may have very limited capacity to identify and produce appropriate indicators. It 
may be better for donor countries to first provide partner countries with greater capacity to 
develop context-specific indicators than to take on the role themselves. The indicators that 
would be developed would be ideally part of a wider partner country anti-corruption strategy, 
rather than an ad hoc process to support the PAFs alone.  
At the same time, the partner country may not always be best placed to develop the most 
appropriate indicators and this would depend on the partner country in question. Neither donor 
countries nor partner countries are uniquely able (or unable) to identify meaningful indicators 
and the issues considered priorities by either donor or partner countries may not be true 
priorities on an objective basis. The decision on whether donor countries, partner countries, or 
a third party leads on developing indicators would be best made on a case-by-case basis.  
• Work towards a comprehensive diagnostic framework for corruption 
All of the countries studied in this paper had PAFs that included indicators relating to public 
financial management. Diagnostic tools, such as PEFA, have helped countries to improve their 
public financial management system. Similar frameworks could be developed, say for 
legislation and measures relating to the judiciary, and for transparency and public reporting, 
which were identified as other common focuses of corruption indicators. For example, 
Repucci (2009) suggests the Due Process of Law Foundation’s (DPLF) “A Guide to Rapid 
Assessment and Policymaking for the Control of Corruption in Latin American Justice 
Systems” as a tool for measures relating to the judiciary, and the UNDP’s “A Guide to 
Measuring the Impact of Right to Information Programmes” or CRINIS (Political party 
finance) as a tool for public reporting.  
It is important not to duplicate existing work, particularly where there are already existing 
tools. PAF indicators should be aligned to a national or regional (e.g., APRM) anti-corruption 
strategy. A wider anti-corruption process could allow the development of better indicators 
without the time restrictions and the political challenges of addressing corruption through 
PAFs. 
When developing corruption indicators, the starting point must be to match the type of 
indicator to the specific goal of including corruption in a PAF. Due to its broad scope, PAFs 
typically rely on a few indicators. If the purpose is to measure broad macro-level change then 
indicators need to reflect this high-level, broad focus. As discussed above, a danger is that, in 
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practice, narrower, institution-level or sector-level indicators are sometimes used as proxies 
for high-level changes that they cannot actually measure.  If the goal of including corruption 
indicators in a PAF is indeed to monitor broad change, the ideal scenario is that the few 
indicators would be aggregates drawn from broader diagnostic frameworks. On the other 
hand, if the purpose is to monitor the progress of specific activities, such as a reform agenda 
or institution, narrower indicators can be used. It is up to the individual donor whether such 
individual initiatives should be singled out. However, rather than “cherry picking” one 
individual indicator to function as a proxy for the progress of a reform or institution, it is 
advisable to base a macro-level PAF indicator on either qualitative milestones and targets or, 
if possible, a composite indicator able to capture overall progress. For example, it is not 
advisable to use the number of prosecutions as a proxy for the work of an anti-corruption 
agency at the PAF level. That indicator would normally be one of many indicators relevant for 
the agency’s strategic plan and M&E framework. It is better to monitor whether the agency 
achieves the objectives set out in its strategic plan. In short, it is recommendable to exploit and 
build on existing anti-corruption processes and align PAF indicators with these processes 
rather than seek to replicate the processes. In terms of influencing long-term change, 
corruption indicators developed from and/or aligned to an existing national anti-corruption 
process are likely to be more effective. 
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Annex A: Country case studies – Overview of corruption 
indicators 
The following are the “corruption” indicators identified from the six case study countries: 
Afghanistan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Uganda. These indicators are those 
whose objectives explicitly mention corruption, as well as those that involve activities similar to those 
outlined in the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Any translations, when 
necessary, were carried out by the authors. 
Table 1 Examples of objectives and indicators relating to corruption 
Objective Indicator 
Afghanistan  
Revenue mobilisation: Revenues cover 
operating costs 
Revenue to GDP ratio; Revenue to operating 
expenditure ratio. 
Medium-Term Fiscal Framework: Progress 
toward fiscal sustainability on expenditure 
Operating expenditures to GDP ratio. 
Spending mix for service delivery: Appropriate 
share of non-salary spending 
% of non-salary in total civilian recurrent 
expenditure; % of non-salary spent in provinces. 
Linkage between budget & strategy: Budget 
reflects Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS) priorities 
No. of costed sector strategies, business plans. 
Budget formulation: Timely and effective 
budget process 
New budget schedule adhered to; Participation in 
programme budgeting. 
Budget execution: Performance in relation to 
annual budget targets 
Execution ratio (operating); Execution ratio 
(development). 
Procurement: Implement new Procurement 
Law 
Number of ministries that prepare procurement 
plans within a month of budget. 
Control framework: Improving fiduciary 
standards 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) 
eligibility ratio (salary); ARTF eligibility ratio (non-
salary); % of staff with individual salary payment. 
Legal framework against corruption: Establish 
an effective legal framework against 
corruption 
The existence of relevant legislation and reports 
from monitoring mechanisms. 
External accountability, audit, scrutiny: Timely 
availability of audited financial statements and 
review by Parliament 
Monthly financial statement & audit for previous 
year’s review by Parliament. 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) reform strategy: 
Implement MoF reform strategy, including at 
No. of mustofiats (Ministry of Finance at 
provincial level) reformed.  
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provincial level 
Public financial management (PFM) reform & 
capacity in line ministries: Effective financial 
management capacity in line ministries 
Number of ministries with effective financial 
management / budget units. 
Government’s PFM system: Improve/maintain 
PFM performance 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
(PEFA) PFM performance ratings. 
Malawi  
Macroeconomic programme Second review of the Exogenous Shock Facility 
successfully completed and a new programme 
agreed with the IMF by December 2009. 
Credibility of the budget In-year expenditure reallocation between votes 
for last financial year amounting to less than 10% 
of the total approved budget. 
Expenditure on essential public services  Budgeted other recurrent transactions for last 
financial year no lower as a proportion of primary 
expenditure than the previous financial year 
level. 
Improved budget process  National budget structure comprising 
programmes and sub-programmes, which are 
GFS 2001 compliant by March this year. 
Improved payroll management Production of at least 5 monthly audit trail 
records by last December. 
Production of a report on actions taken in 
ministries where ghost workers were identified. 
Development and implementation of an 
electronic payroll data transfer between Human 
Resource Management Information System and 
Integrated Financial Information Management 
Systems (IFMIS). 
Timeliness of annual financial statements Roll out of IFMIS to 5 pilot local assemblies 
completed and another 12 district assemblies 
computerised and online with IFMIS. 
Improved timeliness of external audit and 
follow-up 
Submission of last two years' audit reports to 
Parliament by last December. 
Resource mobilisation: Domestic revenue Introduction of electronic banking for all large 
taxpayers. 
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Public procurement: Improved capacity Procurement plans for 50% of the largest 
spending procuring entities linked to their annual 
budget by December 2009.  
Improved procurement specifications and 
evaluation reports submitted by 80% of the 
largest spending procuring entities by December 
last year. 
A drug level availability above that of June 2008 
maintained by government by last December. 
Drug availability increased by at least 2% on all 
drugs less than 100% by last December. 
Corruption Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) performance: 
Number of cases taken to court; number of cases 
concluded. 
Broad progress: Number of Institutional Integrity 
Committees with functional anti-corruption 
action plans established; production and 
implementation of Governance and Corruption 
Survey Report. 
Mozambique  
Promoting transparency in management and 
finances, as well as the integrity of public 
administration systems, increasing the 
accountability of individual employees and 
agents of the state with regard to the 
provision of quality services to citizens 
Increased number of public institutions that in 
the perception of citizens are considered of 
integrity. 
Continued development of actions for 
prevention and combating crime, with 
particular emphasis on corruption and the 
diversion of material resources of the state  
Fighting corruption reinforced by the justice 
sector: Number of corruption cases: (I) 
concluded; (II) under investigation; (III) a. 
charged, b. awaiting stronger evidence before 
being charged, c. archived; and (IV) in court. 
(Objective not defined but under Public 
Financial Management Sector) 
Broad basis tax system, equitable and 
sustainable: Increased tax revenue as % of GDP 
and modernisation of tax management system 
for external foreign trade facilitation. 
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Improved quality and efficiency of the 
expenditure and of the credibility of the state 
budget: % deviation of expenditure carried out by 
sector (agriculture, education, health) and 
regional level (province, district, municipality) 
over the approved budget. 
Increased transparency in government accounts: 
Improvement of the State General Account. 
Increased integrity in public financial 
management: Increased operationalization and 
integrity in the procurement system. 
Increased efficiency and effectiveness of internal 
control system: Improved coverage, quality and 
monitoring of OCIs’ (Organs of Internal Control) 
work. 
Increased efficiency and effectiveness of external 
audit. 
Nicaragua  
Ethics and transparency in public 
management: Raise ethical standards, 
improve transparency of public service, and 
reduce corruption 
Number of cases of economic crimes against the 
state handled by the Attorney General's Office 
and transferred to the Public Ministry. 
Improving public finance: Develop a plan for 
modernisation of public finance; prepare a 
system of performance indicators for each 
result 
Audit to the Attorney General’s Office. 
Entities implementing Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework Budget. 
Number of public authorities using e-recruitment 
and disseminating their online recruitment 
processes. 
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Tanzania  
Accountable governance: Anti-corruption Percentage of cases investigated or completed by 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau 
(PCCB) that are successfully closed or passed for 
prosecution. 
Public Financial Management: Implementation 
of public financial management reform 
programme action plan based on agreed 
assessment criteria; Adherence to Annual 
Audit Cycle 
Government of Tanzania's follow up of Controller 
and Auditor General's annual reports outstanding 
matters within the annual audit cycle. 
Average level of compliance of procuring entities 
with the Procurement Act 2004 to reach 80% by 
2011. 
Approved budget broadly in line with policy 
objectives.  
Expenditure outturn deviation compared to 
original approved budget. 
Uganda  
Formal policy and institutional framework to 
fight corruption is in place and is effectively 
being implemented 
Ensure continuous updating and improvement in 
quality of anti-corruption legislation. 
Enforce legislation, in particular sanctioning and 
recovery of funds by administrative and judicial 
means in grand corruption cases. 
Audit reports and Parliamentary Accounts 
Committee’s reviews of the same completed 
within specified timeframes, with timely and 
effective follow up on findings by the executive. 
Action on corruption through effective follow 
up on audit report findings 
Follow up and action on special audits of grand 
corruption cases. 
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Preparation and implementation of the 
budget, internal budget accountability and 
external budgetary control satisfy the basic 
conditions for good PFM including 
transparency, accountability, and 
effectiveness of use of resources  
 
A credible and relevant programme to 
improve PFM and procurement systems is in 
place and some progress in performance has 
been recorded over the period under review 
 
Progress is recorded on PEFA dimensions of PFM 
and procurement, including:  
-  Credibility of the budget;  
-  Comprehensiveness and transparency;  
-  Policy-based budgeting;  
-  Predictability and control in budget execution;  
-  Procurement – competition, value for money, 
and controls in procurement;  
-  Accounting, recording, and reporting;  
-  External scrutiny and audit;  
-  Progress in implementing the PFM and 
procurement reform agendas are monitored 
annually;  
-  Public sector actions to improve PFM and 
procurement systems are refined annually to 
improve impact.  
Key assessment documentation includes PEFA 
reports, annual independent review reports, 
Auditor General’s reports and other available 
analysis/documentation including Public 
Expenditure Reviews, national budget, budget 
speech, etc. 
Credibility of the budget % budget variance between allocations and 
releases of Joint Budget Support (JBS) sectors.  
% budget variance between releases and actuals 
of JBS sectors. 
Timing of releases of JBS sectors where work 
plans (including procurement and recruitment 
plans) are received on time and conform to 
quality standard. 
% aligned work plans in JBS sectors (including 
procurement and recruitment plans) received in a 
timely manner and approved by Ministry of 
Finance Planning and Economic Development. 
Arrears as % of total expenditures. 
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Reporting on budget at service level % of quarterly central government actual 
expenditures reported on time. 
% of quarterly local government actual 
expenditures reported on time. 
% of quarterly domestic revenue reported on 
time. 
% of local government publishing financial 
transfers and budgets at local level. 
Compliance % clean audit reports (central, local and statutory 
bodies). 
Procurement practices Measuring value for money and compliance in 
procurement. 
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Annex B: Country case studies – Focus, background and 
types of indicators 
Focus of indicators 
Public Financial Management or PFM (including procurement) 
• Afghanistan: Indicators include assessing the number of ministries with effective financial 
management or budget units, monitoring revenue, sector planning, budget scheduling, 
procurement planning, and financial auditing. One indicator specifically relates to the Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) PFM performance rating. 
• Malawi: An even larger number of PFM and procurement indicators are included in this 
framework. These include progress relating to an Exogenous Shock Facility (an IMF loan 
which is designed to mitigate the impact of adverse economic conditions beyond a country’s 
control); several indicators relating to budgeting process; auditing; reporting on actions of 
identifying ghost workers; progress on payroll, human resources, and financial data systems; 
and electronic banking for all large taxpayers. Procurement indicators focus on linking 
spending to the annual budget and notably the availability of drugs. 
• Mozambique: PFM indicators include increasing tax revenue as percentage of GDP, 
modernising the tax management system for foreign trade, improving budgeting, and 
increasing transparency in government accounts. Procurement indicators include increased 
operationalization and integrity in procurement. 
• Nicaragua: Relevant indicators include audit of the Attorney General’s Office, the number of 
entities implementing the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (a planning and budget 
formulation process), and the number of public authorities using e-recruitment and 
disseminating their online recruitment processes.  
• Tanzania: The PAF includes indicators on follow up of the Controller and Auditor General’s 
annual reports within the annual audit cycle, the level of compliance of procuring entities with 
the Procurement Act 2004, the approved budget being broadly in line with policy objectives, 
and expenditure outturn deviation compared to original approved budget.  
• Uganda:  The PAF contains a large number of indicators relating to public financial 
management. These are aligned to several dimensions of the PEFA framework, including 
credibility of the budget; policy-based budgeting; predictability and control in budget 
execution; competition, value for money, and controls in procurement; accounting, recording, 
and reporting; and external scrutiny and audit. Other indicators include budget variance (the 
difference between a budgeted amount and the actual amount incurred), timing of releases, 
and work plan alignment in relation to Joint Budget Support sectors, as well as an indicator 
measuring “value for money.” 
Legislation and legal processes 
• Afghanistan: Afghanistan has a recent history of anti-corruption legislation. It ratified the 
UNCAC in 2007, and subsequently adapted national legislation to include anti-corruption 
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components. There has been a presidential decree that established the High Office for 
Oversight for Anti-Corruption and Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. These have been 
part of the indicators focused on the existence of relevant legislation. 
• Malawi: There are no indicators that focus on legislation. However, other indicators do 
include written measures. These are the establishment of anti-corruption action plans and the 
production and implementation of the Governance and Corruption Survey Report. 
• Mozambique: Mozambique’s indicators include combating corruption through the justice 
sector. They specifically monitor the number of corruption cases, namely, cases which are 
concluded, under investigation, charged, awaiting stronger evidence before being charged, 
archived, and in court.  
• Nicaragua: Nicaragua’s PAF indicators monitored the number of cases of “economic crimes” 
against the state handled by the Attorney General’s Office and transferred to the Public 
Ministry. Whereas other countries focus on corruption-related crimes the term “economic 
crimes” would denote a broader range of activity, which is opposed by the state and not 
necessarily corruption as such.  
• Uganda: Uganda has a well-established anti-corruption legal framework. Major anti-
corruption legislation includes the Penal Code Act (PCA), the Prevention of Corruption Act, 
the Inspectorate of Government Act 2002 (IGG Act), the Public Finance and Accountability 
Act 2003 (PFAA), the Leadership Code Act 2002 (LCA), and the Public Prosecution and 
Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003. Uganda’s PAF indicators focus on ensuring continuous 
updating and improvement in quality of anti-corruption legislation as well as enforcement of 
legislation, in particular sanctioning and recovery of funds. 
Transparency and accountability 
• Afghanistan: Afghanistan’s PAF corruption indicators include regular monthly production of 
financial and annual audits (for the previous year) that can be reviewed by Parliament. These 
serve the objective of external accountability, audit, and scrutiny. Another indicator is the 
number of ministries that prepare procurement plans within a month of budget. 
• Mozambique: The PAF has several poorly defined indicators focusing on transparency and 
accountability. These are the improvement of State General Account; the increased 
operationalization and integrity in the procurement system; improved coverage, quality and 
monitoring of internal control systems; and increased efficiency and effectiveness of external 
audit. How these improvements and progress will be measured is not actually detailed within 
the PAF. 
• Uganda: Uganda’s PAF corruption indicators include assessing levels of actual expenditures 
reported on time by local and central government, domestic revenue reported on time, and 
publishing of financial transfers and budgets at a local level. 
Anti-Corruption Agencies 
• Malawi: Malawi has set up an anti-corruption agency whose performance is monitored 
through PAF indicators. In particular the indicators monitor the progress of the Anti-
Corruption Bureau on the number of cases taken to court and the number of cases concluded. 
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It also looks at the number of institutional integrity committees with functional anti-corruption 
plans. 
• Tanzania: Tanzania’s PAF includes an indicator related to its anti-corruption agency – the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB). The indicator is the percentage of 
cases investigated or completed by PCCB that are successfully closed or passed for 
prosecution. 
Perceptions 
• Mozambique: Mozambique is the only one of the six countries reviewed in this study that 
includes assessments of perceptions of institutions. In particular it monitors perceptions of 
public institutions by citizens and gives the number of those institutions judged to be of 
integrity as an indicator.  
“Economic crimes against the state” 
• Nicaragua: Nicaragua has an arguably unique indicator of the number of cases of economic 
crimes against the state handled by the Attorney General and the Public Ministry.  
Indicator background  
• Afghanistan: Corruption is acknowledged as a major impediment to the development of the 
country in the Afghanistan Compact of 2006 and the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS) (UNODC n.d.). The ANDS serves as the Afghan Poverty Reduction 
Strategy document. Afghanistan is also a signatory to and has ratified the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). However, the indicators within the Performance 
Assistance Framework (PAF) do not seem to have been derived directly from the ANDS. 
Instead there is a much wider anti-corruption initiative including the establishment of the High 
Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (High Office or HOO), and law reforms and 
anticorruption efforts by the High Office, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Supreme 
Court. The PAF corruption indicators act as one part of this wider anti-corruption effort. 
Public Financial Management (PFM) reform began in Afghanistan in 2002, shortly after the 
ruling Taliban government was removed from power and a transitional government was 
established by the Bonn Agreement (FreeBalance 2011). Afghanistan has since conducted two 
PFM system performance assessments, in June 2005 and December 2007, using the Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) methodology. 
• Malawi: Malawi’s PAF includes indicators which monitor the progress of the Anti-
Corruption Bureau (ACB) on the number of cases taken to court and the number of cases 
concluded. The establishment of the ACB follows on from the constitution and subsequent 
legislation. In 1995, Malawi adopted a new constitution, which emphasised the need to 
introduce measures to “guarantee accountability, transparency, personal integrity and financial 
probity and which by virtue of their effectiveness and transparency will strengthen confidence 
in public institutions” (Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau n.d.). As a result of this, Parliament 
passed the Corrupt Practices Act of 1995, which under Section 4(1) established the ACB. The 
ACB began its full operations in 1998 and was given increased powers in 2004 in an 
amendment to the act. The role of the Institutional Integrity Committees and the National 
Governance and Corruption Surveys are part of the work of the prevention division of the 
ACB and outlined within the ACB Strategic Plan 2007–2011 Norwegian Agency for 
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Development Cooperation 2010). In relation to PFM reform, a Public Financial and Economic 
Management (PFEM) Action Plan was established in November 2006, building on the 2003 
Malawi Financial Accountability Action Plan (MFAAP) and the PEFA reports from 2005 and 
2006 (Oduro, Quist, and Steen 2008). The reforms have been supported by donors through the 
Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS) Group since 1997. Prior to this Malawi had 
implemented a series of structural adjustment programmes since the beginning of the 1980s 
(Durevall and Erlandsson 2005). 
• Mozambique: Mozambique’s PAF corruption indicators monitor perceptions of public 
institutions by citizens and the number of those judged to be of integrity. This is linked to both 
the government’s five-year plan and the Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta 
(PARPA) – a PRSP. There are also several, not very clearly defined, indicators that are not 
linked to either of the strategy plans. These are transparency of government accounts; integrity 
of the procurement system; efficient and effective internal control mechanisms; and external 
audit. In relation to PFM reform the first structural adjustment programme was in 1987 but 
since the late 1990s Mozambique has embarked on a comprehensive public sector reform 
programme. These reforms were the results of two key pieces of legislation: the Budget Law 
of 1997 and the SISTAFE (Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado or State Financial 
Management System) Law of 2003 (de Renzio 2007). 
• Nicaragua: In the case of Nicaragua, the first PAF was based on the PRSP of 2001. The 
PRSP was modified in 2005 with a revised PAF. The 2006 elections brought in a new 
government that was less accepting of the strategies embedded in the PRSPs (Hinds 2010). 
The new government failed to comply with the deadlines that would have made budgetary 
support possible in 2008. The government then presented a new PAF, but this lacked strategic 
objectives and the required detail to link it to the budget. The government eventually went to 
prepare a new PRSP to support the goals established in the 2007 PAF. Nicaragua is unique in 
having a PRSP based on a PAF. The indicator that appears in the 2007 PAF is the most 
questionable corruption indicator of the six countries surveyed. It is not clear how a change in 
the number of cases of “economic crimes against the state” handled by the Attorney General’s 
Office and transferred to the Public Ministry would meet the given objectives of raising 
ethical standards, improving transparency of public service, and reducing corruption. 
Nicaragua has continued since 2005 to roll out wide-ranging PFM reforms (Yaker 2009). 
There has been a commitment to carry on with these reforms in the preparation of a medium-
term plan (2008–2012) for strengthening PFM called the Plan of Modernization of the 
Financial Administration System (in Spanish Plan de Modernizacion del Sistema de 
Administracion Financiera – PMSAF). Of note is that adopting such a plan was part of the 
IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) conditionality. 
• Tanzania: In Tanzania, the legislation that established the Anti-Corruption Bureau precedes 
the PRSP process by several years. The 1971 Prevention of Corruption Act resulted in the 
establishment of the Anti-Corruption Squad (ACS) which eventually became the Prevention 
and Combating of Corruption Bureau under the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act 
of 2007 (Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau n.d.). The corruption indicators in 
the Tanzania PAF relate to the number of cases investigated and prosecuted by the PCCB. In 
relation to PFM, the World Bank initiated the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF), a planning and budget formulation process, in 1997 during its annual Public 
Expenditure Review exercise. Its development was made a condition of the structural 
adjustment programme (Wynne 2005). Tanzania also undertook PEFA assessments in 2006 
and 2009. 
• Uganda: Uganda has a strong anti-corruption legal framework. Major anti-corruption 
legislation includes the PCA, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the IGG Act, the PFAA, the 
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LCA, and the Public Prosecution and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003. Historically it 
seems that though the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) has provided a forum for 
government-donor dialogue, it has not been used specifically as a vehicle for anti-corruption 
measures. In this case, the indicators may well be linked to the National Development 
Programme but this is not clear. In relation to PFM, following a lapse in fiscal discipline, 
which resulted in high inflation in the early 1990s, Uganda’s priority became establishing 
macroeconomic stability. As a result the Government of Uganda introduced an MTEF largely 
on its own initiative. Uganda also undertook PEFA assessments in 2006 and 2009. 
Types of indicators 
• Afghanistan: The main corruption indicators in Afghanistan focus on outputs – the passing of 
legislation and production of audits and financial reports. 
• Malawi: Malawi PAF corruption indicators also focus on outputs by monitoring the number 
of cases taken to court or concluded, the number of functional anti-corruption committees, and 
the production of reports.  
• Mozambique: By including perception of public institutions, Mozambique monitors the 
outcome of past anti-corruption reforms of public institutions and efforts to portray 
institutions in a more favourable manner. There are also output indicators looking at progress 
in corruption cases as well as less defined indicators relating to transparency, integrity, and 
effectiveness of control systems and audits.  
• Nicaragua: Nicaragua’s PAF output-focused corruption indicator is the number of cases of 
economic crimes against the state handled by the Attorney General’s Office and transferred to 
the Public Ministry. It is unclear how this is measured and assessed. 
• Tanzania: Tanzania’s output-focused indicators look at the percentage of court cases 
outstanding for two years or more, and the percentage of cases investigated or completed by 
the PCCB that are successfully closed or passed for prosecution.  
• Uganda: Uganda also focuses on outputs, in particular improvement in anti-corruption 
legislation and enforcement of said legislation. There are no baseline and targets designed for 
most of the indicators. The last indicator – follow up and action on special audits of grand 
corruption cases – is more defined. The baseline is a Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting and a production of a special audit and a management letter. Subsequent annual 
targets are the production of special audits and management letters.  
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Annex C: UNCAC and Performance Assessment 
Framework (PAF) indicators 
The following is a breakdown of Chapters II–V of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC). The articles below are those that have suggestions for activities to help fulfil the listed 
objectives.  
The articles listed below have suggested activities to fulfil the objectives set out in the UNCAC. These 
are derived from the Legislative Guide (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006) and the 
Technical Guide (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2009) that were produced to support 
implementation of the UNCAC. These activities have the potential to be used as indicators though 
neither the UNCAC nor the accompanying guides indicate how these activities should be prioritised. 
Also included in the table below are the PAF indicators from six countries, which are aligned to the 
objective of the article. The six countries are: Afghanistan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Tanzania, and Uganda. 
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Table 1: Existing PAF indicators and potential PAF indicators for UNCAC Chapter II – Preventive 
measures  
Article Existing indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 5: 
Preventive anti-
corruption 
policies and 
practices 
Uganda. Ensure continuous 
updating and improvement in 
quality of anti-corruption 
legislation. 
Develop effective anti-corruption and 
coherent policies which: 
 Emphasise prevention 
 Is comprehensive and coherent 
 Include societal participation 
 Reflect all parts of the UNCAC 
 Identify, obtain, analyse, disseminate, 
and adapt good practices at all levels  
Article 6: 
Preventive anti-
corruption 
body or bodies 
Malawi. Anti-corruption bureau 
performance: Number of cases 
taken to court; number of cases 
concluded. 
 
Malawi. Broad progress: 
Number of Institutional Integrity 
Committees with functional anti-
corruption action plans 
established; production and 
implementation of Governance 
and Corruption Survey Report. 
 
Tanzania. Percentage of cases 
investigated or completed by 
Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCCB) that 
are successfully closed or passed 
for prosecution. 
Establish or reform bodies to be 
independent, accountable, 
appropriately staffed, and resourced 
able to perform the following functions:  
 Require public sector institutions to 
produce anti-corruption action plans;  
 Undertake evaluations or inspections of 
institutions;  
 Receive and review complaints from the 
public, receiving audit, investigative or 
parliamentary reports from those 
bodies responsible for anti-corruption 
investigations;  
 Undertake research into legislation and 
administrative procedures; 
 Undertake public opinion surveys, and 
develop other sources of information;  
 Take evidence on and conduct hearings 
for periodic reviews of progress on the 
anti-corruption plans 
 Enter into agreements to facilitate 
collaboration on anti-corruption with 
other agencies and with relevant 
international and regional organisations 
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Article Existing indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 7: Public 
sector 
  Efficient, transparent, and objective 
systems for recruitment, hiring, 
retention, promotion, and retirement of 
public officials 
 Procedures for the selection and 
training for positions vulnerable to 
corruption 
 Adequate remuneration and pay scales 
 Training public officials in ethics 
 Candidature for and election to public 
office criteria 
 Transparency in campaign and political 
party financing 
 Transparency in and the prevention of 
conflicts of interest 
Article 8: Codes 
of conduct for 
public officials 
  Promotion of integrity, honesty, and 
responsibility among public officials 
 Standards of behaviour and codes of 
conduct 
 Applicability and compliance 
 Reporting by public officials of acts of 
corruption 
 Disclosure systems 
 Disciplinary measures 
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Article Existing indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 9: Public 
procurement 
and the 
management of 
public finances 
Afghanistan. Number of 
ministries that prepare 
procurement plans within a 
month of budget.  
Afghanistan. Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund 
(ARTF) eligibility ratio (salary); 
ARTF eligibility ratio (non-salary); 
% of staff with Individual Salary 
Payment 
Afghanistan. Number of 
ministries with effective 
Financial Management / Budget 
Units 
Mozambique. Improved quality 
and efficiency of the expenditure 
and of the credibility of the State 
Budget 
Mozambique. Increased 
integrity in public financial 
management – Increased 
operationalization and integrity 
in the procurement system 
Mozambique. Increased 
efficiency and effectiveness of 
internal control system: 
Improved coverage, quality and 
monitoring of OCIs' (Organs of 
Internal Control) work 
Tanzania. Government of 
Tanzania’s follow up of 
Controller and Auditor General’s 
annual reports outstanding 
matters within the annual audit 
cycle 
Tanzania. Average level of 
compliance of procuring entities 
with the Procurement Act 2004 
to reach 80% by 2011 
 
Tanzania. Approved budget 
broadly in line with policy 
objectives  
Set out procurement systems to include: 
 Principles 
 Measures to enhance transparency 
 Rules of the tender and review process 
 Personnel responsible for procurement  
 
Set out public finance systems to 
include: 
 Transparent, comprehensive, and 
credible management of public finances 
 Procedures for the adoption of the 
national budget 
 Timely reporting on revenue and 
expenditure 
 Accounting, auditing, and oversight 
 Risk management and internal control 
systems  
 Measures to preserve the integrity of 
relevant documentation 
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Article Existing indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Tanzania. Expenditure outturn 
deviation compared to original 
approved budget 
Uganda. Progress is recorded on 
Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability (PEFA) 
dimensions of public financial 
management (PFM) and 
procurement 
Uganda. % budget variance 
between allocations and releases 
of Joint Budget Support  (JBS) 
sectors  
Uganda. % budget variance 
between releases and actuals of 
JBS sectors 
Uganda. Timing of releases of 
JBS sectors where work plans 
(including procurement and 
recruitment plans) are received 
on time and conforming to 
quality standard 
Uganda. % aligned work plans in 
JBS sectors (including 
procurement and recruitment 
plans) received in a timely 
manner and approved by 
Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development 
Uganda: Arrears as % of total 
expenditures 
Uganda: Measuring Value For 
Money and compliance in 
procurement 
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Article Existing indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 10: 
Public 
reporting 
Malawi. Monthly financial 
statement and audit for previous 
year’s review by Parliament 
Mozambique. Increased 
transparency in government 
accounts – Improvement of the 
State General Account 
Mozambique. Increased 
efficiency and effectiveness of 
external audit 
Uganda. Audit reports and 
Parliamentary Accounts 
Committees reviews of the audit 
reports completed within 
specified timeframes, with 
timely and effective follow up on 
findings by the executive 
Uganda. Key assessment 
documentation includes PEFA 
reports, annual independent 
review reports, Auditor 
General’s reports, and other 
available 
analysis/documentation 
including Public Expenditure 
Reviews, national budget, and 
budget speech. 
Uganda. % of quarterly central 
government actual expenditures 
reported on time 
Uganda. % of quarterly local 
government actual expenditures 
reported on time 
Uganda. % of quarterly domestic 
revenue reported on time 
Uganda. % of local government 
publishing financial transfers and 
budgets at local level 
Uganda. % clean audit reports 
(central, local and statutory 
bodies) 
 
 
 
 Measures to enhance transparency in 
public administration 
 Access to information concerning public 
administration 
 Access to decision-making authorities 
through simplified administrative 
procedures 
 Periodic public reporting, including risks 
of corruption 
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Article Existing indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 11: 
Measures 
relating to the 
judiciary and 
prosecution 
services  
Mozambique. Fighting 
corruption reinforced by the 
justice sector – number of 
corruption cases: (I) concluded; 
(II) under investigation; (III) a. 
charged, b. awaiting stronger 
evidence before being charged, 
c. archived; and (IV) in court 
Nicaragua. Number of cases of 
economic crimes against the 
state handled by the Attorney 
General’s Office and transferred 
to the Public Ministry. 
 Measures to strengthen integrity of 
judges 
 Measures to prevent opportunities for 
corruption in the judiciary 
 Codes and standards 
 Measures to strengthen the integrity of 
prosecutors  
 Measures to prevent the opportunities 
for corruption in the prosecution service 
 Codes and standards of conduct for 
prosecutors 
Article 12: 
Private sector 
  Measures to prevent corruption 
involving the private sector 
 Measures to enhance accounting and 
auditing standards 
 Civil, administrative, or criminal 
penalties for the private sector 
 Measures to promote cooperation 
between law enforcement and the 
private sector 
 Standards and procedures to safeguard 
the integrity of the private sector 
 Transparency in the establishment and 
management of corporate entities 
 Preventing the misuse of procedures 
regulating private entities 
 Post-employment restrictions for public 
officials in the private sector 
 Internal auditing and certification 
procedures 
 Maintenance of books, records, 
financial statement disclosure, and 
accounting and auditing standards 
 Prohibition of tax-deductibility of bribes 
and related expenses 
U4 Issue 2012:1 Corruption indicators in Performance 
Assessment Frameworks for budget support 
www.U4.no 
 
42 
Article Existing indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 13: 
Participation of 
society  
Mozambique. Increased number 
of public institutions that in the 
perception of citizens are 
considered of integrity 
 Promote the participation of society in 
the prevention of corruption 
 Raise public awareness on corruption 
 Promote the contribution of the public 
to decision-making processes 
 Public information and education 
 Freedom to seek, receive, publish, and 
disseminate information concerning 
corruption and its restrictions 
 Raise public awareness on anti-
corruption bodies 
 Public access to information 
 (Anonymous) reporting of corruption 
Article 14: 
Measures to 
prevent 
money-
laundering 
  Choose a relevant institutional anti-
money-laundering framework 
 Identify who should be subject to 
preventive obligations 
 Identify what the minimum 
requirements for regulated institutions 
or activities are 
 Promote reporting 
 Exchange financial information 
 Cross-border movement of cash and 
negotiable instruments 
 Money transfers 
 Implement through regional, 
interregional and/or multilateral 
organisations 
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Table 2: Existing PAF indicators and potential PAF indicators for UNCAC Chapter III – 
Criminalisation and law enforcement 
Article Existing Indicators Potential indicators/activities 
Article 30: 
Prosecution, 
adjudication, and 
sanctions 
Uganda. Enforce 
legislation, in particular 
sanctioning and recovery 
of funds by administrative 
and judicial means in 
grand corruption cases. 
(Also Article 31) 
- Sanctions that take into account the gravity 
of that offence 
- Immunities or jurisdictional privileges for 
senior public officials and members of the 
legislature to safeguard state functions 
- Discretionary legal powers 
- Decisions on release pending trial or appeal 
- Early release or parole of persons 
- Removal, suspension or reassignment of 
office 
- Disqualification from holding public office 
or holding office in an enterprise 
- Reintegration into society 
Article 31: 
Freezing, seizure, 
and confiscation 
Uganda. Enforce 
legislation, in particular 
sanctioning and recovery 
of funds by administrative 
and judicial means in 
grand corruption cases. 
(Also Article 30) 
- Differentiate between types of confiscation 
- Identify models of confiscation 
- Identify what to consider as proceeds of 
crime for purposes of confiscation  
- Outline preliminary measures for eventual 
confiscations 
- Consider shifting the burden of proof in 
regard to the origin of the alleged proceeds 
of crime 
- Protect bona fide third parties 
Article 32: 
Protection of 
witnesses, 
experts, and 
victims 
 - Protection of witnesses, experts, relatives, 
and other persons close to them 
- Implementing comprehensive witness 
protection programmes 
- Agreements or arrangements with other 
States to support cross-border witness 
protection 
- Enabling the views and concerns of victims 
to be presented and considered at 
appropriate stages of criminal proceedings 
Article 33: 
Protection of 
reporting persons 
 - Design the policy framework  
- Engage public officials 
- Engage the public 
- Identify the competent authority or 
authorities to receive the reports 
- Specify criteria for reporting 
- Protect reporting persons 
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Article Existing Indicators Potential indicators/activities 
Article 34: 
Consequences of 
acts of corruption
  
Uganda. Follow up and 
action on special audits of 
grand corruption cases 
- Specify types of measures 
- Focus on prevention 
- Ensure that the measures fit with domestic 
law 
Article 35: 
Compensation for 
damage 
 - Take measures to ensure that entities or 
persons who have suffered damage as a 
result of an act of corruption have the right 
to initiate legal proceedings against those 
responsible to obtain compensation 
Article 36: 
Specialised 
authorities 
 - Define the type of specialised authority  
- Identify the added value and role of 
specialised authorities 
- Ensure authority independence and 
sufficient resources 
Article 37: 
Cooperation with 
law enforcement 
authorities 
 During the investigation and prosecution:  
- Ensure information submitted is useful and 
relevant 
- Consider the mitigation of punishment  
- Consider immunity to those who provide 
substantial cooperation 
- Take into account the possibility that an 
offender in one State Party may be able to 
provide information useful in a case under 
investigation in another State Party 
Article 38: 
Cooperation 
between national 
authorities 
 - Establish the requirement that senior 
management of public authorities and 
public officials understand the purpose of 
the article and their role in implementing it. 
Article 39: 
Cooperation 
between national 
authorities and 
the private sector 
 - Ensure that private sector entities 
understand the purpose of the article and 
their role in supporting the Convention 
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Article Existing Indicators Potential indicators/activities 
Article 40: Bank 
secrecy 
 - Identify who has authority to overcome 
bank secrecy, under what circumstances, 
and for what purposes 
- Identify what is procedurally required to lift 
bank secrecy 
- Facilitate automatic disclosure of the 
information, or upon request 
- Employ use of centralised databases  
- Outline the content of a request  
- Implement the preventive principles of 
“know your customer and know your 
beneficial owner” 
- Ensure bank secrecy provisions do not 
impede the access of authorised agencies 
to banking information 
Article 41: 
Criminal record 
 - Adopt measures to take into consideration 
any previous conviction in another State in 
criminal proceedings 
Article 42: 
Jurisdiction 
 - Ensure jurisdiction over an offence 
committed in its territory irrespective of 
the nationality of the offender 
- Consider establishing jurisdiction for 
offences committed against their nationals 
irrespective of the place where the crime 
has taken place 
- Establish jurisdiction over preparatory 
money-laundering offences 
- Implement the provision on the protection 
principle 
- Establish criminal jurisdiction on the basis 
of the principle aut dedere aut judicare – 
extradite or prosecute 
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Table 3: Existing PAF indicators and potential PAF indicators for UNCAC Chapter IV – International 
cooperation 
Article Existing Indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 43: 
International 
cooperation 
 - Address the specific issue of determining 
dual criminality  
- Clearly define the role of a central (or other 
competent) authority 
- Create domestic legal and institutional 
frameworks for fostering international 
cooperation 
- Ensure resources and address practical 
problems in the field of international 
cooperation in criminal matters 
Article 44: 
Extradition 
 - Create mutual awareness of 
national/international extradition law and 
practice  
- Set up the legal framework for extradition  
- Adopt measures to enable the simplification 
and improvement of the extradition process 
Article 45: 
Transfer of 
sentenced 
persons 
 - Enter into agreements on the transfer to 
their territory of persons sentenced to 
imprisonment 
- Create appropriate procedures to ensure 
protection of rights of persons involved 
Article 46: 
Mutual legal 
assistance 
 - Create a legal basis and procedures, formal 
or informal, to provide mutual legal 
assistance with respect to investigations, 
prosecutions, and judicial proceedings 
- Ensure that states cannot refuse mutual legal 
assistance on the ground of bank secrecy 
Article 47: 
Transfer of 
criminal 
proceedings 
 - Outline procedures for transferring to one 
another proceedings for the prosecution of 
an offence when considered to be in the 
interests of the proper administration of 
justice 
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Article 48: Law 
enforcement 
cooperation 
 - Conclude agreements to facilitate effective 
coordination among law enforcement 
authorities 
- Designate a specific agency or agencies to 
deal with requests relating to law 
enforcement cooperation 
- Authorise agency to undertake investigative 
activities on behalf of a foreign State Party 
- Authorise agency to share information, take 
lead responsibility in coordination and 
cooperation arrangements with other 
agencies in foreign States Parties 
Article 49: Joint 
investigations 
 - Create procedures to involve other State 
Party authorities in joint investigations or 
joint investigative task forces to deal with 
multijurisdictional cases 
- Ensure that such procedures are based on an 
established framework rather than ad hoc 
Article 50: 
Special 
investigative 
techniques 
 - Ensure authorities have the power to 
undertake technical forms of surveillance 
and other special investigative techniques 
- Produce clear guidelines on the use of such 
techniques 
- Ensure evidence derived from the use of 
special investigative techniques is admissible 
in national courts 
- Conclude agreements for promoting 
international cooperation in using special 
investigative techniques 
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Table 4: Existing PAF indicators and potential PAF indicators for UNCAC Chapter V – Asset recovery 
Article Existing Indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 51: 
General 
 - Promote the return of assets as a fundamental 
principle 
Article 52: 
Prevention and 
detection of 
transfers of 
proceeds of crime 
 - Issue advisories regarding the persons whose 
accounts will require enhanced scrutiny 
- Issue advisories regarding the types of accounts 
and transactions to which to pay particular 
attention 
- Ensure appropriate account-opening, 
maintenance and record-keeping measures 
- Notify financial institutions the identity of persons 
whose accounts require enhanced scrutiny 
- Implement measures to ensure that its financial 
institutions maintain adequate records 
- Implement appropriate and effective measures to 
prevent the establishment of banks that have no 
physical presence and that are not affiliated with 
a regulated financial group (shell banks) 
- Require financial institutions to refuse to enter 
into or continue a correspondent banking 
relationship with such institutions 
- Establish effective financial disclosure systems for 
appropriate public officials  
- Permit authorities to share information with the 
authorities in other States Parties when necessary 
to investigate, claim, and recover proceeds of 
offences  
- Require appropriate public officials to report 
having a financial account in a foreign country to 
report that relationship to appropriate authorities 
and to maintain appropriate records related to 
such accounts 
- Provide for appropriate sanctions for non-
compliance  
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Article Existing Indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 53: 
Measures for 
direct recovery of 
property 
 - Take measures to permit another State Party to 
initiate civil action to establish ownership of 
property acquired following an offence  
- Take measures to permit its courts to order those 
who have committed offences to pay compensation 
or damages to another State Party that has been 
harmed by such offences  
- When having to decide on confiscation take 
measures to permit its courts to recognise another 
State Party’s claim as a legitimate owner of property 
acquired following an offence 
Article 54: 
Mechanisms for 
recovery of 
property through 
international 
cooperation in 
confiscation 
 - Take measures to permit authorities to give effect to 
an order of confiscation issued by a court of another 
State Party 
- Take measures to permit authorities to order the 
confiscation of such property of foreign origin by 
adjudication of an offence of money-laundering  
- Take measures to allow confiscation of property 
without a criminal conviction in cases in which the 
offender cannot be prosecuted by reason of death, 
flight, or absence or in other appropriate cases 
- Take measures to permit authorities to seize 
property following an order issued by a reasonable 
authority of a requesting State Party  
- Take measures to permit authorities to freeze or 
seize property upon a reasonable request by a State 
Party 
- Take measures to permit authorities to preserve 
property for confiscation where necessary 
Article 55: 
International 
cooperation for 
purposes of 
confiscation 
 Create systems which are able to: 
- Receive requests from other State Parties for 
confiscation of proceeds of crime, property, 
equipment etc. 
- Submit such requests to its own authorities for the 
purpose of obtaining an order of confiscation and 
give effect to it 
- Take measures to identify, trace, and freeze or seize 
proceeds of crime, property, equipment 
- Provide adequate notification to bona fide third 
parties  
- Ensure due process and a statement that the 
confiscation order is final 
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Article Existing Indicators Potential indicators/activities  
Article 56: Special 
cooperation 
 - Take measures to permit it to forward information 
on proceeds of offences when such information 
might assist another State Party in initiating or 
carrying out investigations, prosecutions, or judicial 
proceedings 
Article 57: Return 
and disposal of 
assets 
 
 
 - Conclude mutually acceptable arrangements for the 
final disposal of confiscated property 
- Ensure that property confiscated by a State Party 
shall be disposed of, including by return to its prior 
legitimate owners 
- Enable authorities to return confiscated property 
taking into account the rights of bona fide third 
parties 
- Enable the return of embezzled public funds or 
property to the requesting State Party 
- Enable compensating the victims of the crime 
- Where necessary ensure systems to deduct 
reasonable expenses incurred in investigations, 
prosecutions ,or judicial proceedings leading to the 
return or disposition of confiscated property 
Article 58: 
Financial 
intelligence unit 
(FIU) 
 - Establish an FIU to be responsible for receiving, 
analysing, and disseminating to authorities reports 
of suspicious financial transactions 
- Ensure cooperation with one another for the 
purpose of preventing and combating the transfer of 
proceeds of offences 
Article 59: 
Bilateral and 
multilateral 
agreements and 
arrangements 
 - Conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements or 
arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of 
international cooperation 
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Table 5: Overlap of PAF indicator focus in 6 case studies and UNCAC compatible activities. 
 
Chapter 
Are there PAF 
indicators in 6 
case studies? 
 I General provisions – Articles 1–4  n/a 
 II Preventive measures – Articles 5–14 Yes 
 III Criminalisation and law enforcement – Articles 15–42 Yes 
 IV International cooperation – Articles 43–50 No 
 V Asset recovery – Articles 51–59 No 
 VI Technical assistance and information exchange – Articles 60–62 n/a 
 VII Mechanisms for implementation – Articles 63–64 n/a 
 VIII Final provisions – Articles 65–71 n/a 
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Table 5: Overlap of PAF indicator focus in 6 case studies and UNCAC Chapter II – Preventive 
measures 
 Countries with UNCAC 
compliant PAF indicators 
 
 
Article 
Af
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n 
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ia
 
U
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a 
Article 5: Preventive anti-corruption policies and practices      X 
Article 6: Preventive anti-corruption body or bodies  X   X  
Article 7: Public sector       
Article 8: Codes of conduct for public officials       
Article 9: Public procurement and the management of public 
finances 
X X X  X X 
Article 10: Public reporting  X X   X 
Article 11: Measures relating to the judiciary and prosecution 
services 
  X X   
Article 12: Private sector       
Article 13: Participation of society    X    
Article 14: Measures to prevent money-laundering       
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Table 6: Overlap of PAF indicator focus in 6 case studies and UNCAC Chapter III – Criminalisation 
and law enforcement 
 Countries with UNCAC 
compliant PAF indicators 
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Article 30: Prosecution, adjudication, and sanctions      X 
Article 31: Freezing, seizure, and confiscation      X 
Article 32: Protection of witnesses, experts, and victims       
Article 33: Protection of reporting persons       
Article 34: Consequences of acts of corruption       X 
Article 35: Compensation for damage       
Article 36: Specialised authorities       
Article 37: Cooperation with law enforcement authorities       
Article 38: Cooperation between national authorities       
Article 39: Cooperation between national authorities and the 
private sector 
      
Article 40: Bank secrecy       
Article 41: Criminal record       
Article 42: Jurisdiction       
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Table 7: Overview of corruption indicators in 6 countries and overlap with UNCAC 
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Public Financial Management  X X X X X X 9 
Legislation and legal processes X  X X  X 5 
Transparency and accountability X  X   X 10 
Anti-corruption agencies  X   X  6 
Perception assessments   X    13 
“Economic crimes against the state”    X   11 
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Corruption indicators have been used in budget support Performance Assessment 
Frameworks (PAFs) for a variety of purposes, including to control for misappropriation of 
funds, assess Government performance on fighting corruption, and in some cases act as an 
aid disbursement trigger. This literature- and interview-based study maps PAF corruption 
indicators and examines their role and effectiveness in monitoring corruption. The study 
finds that if corruption-related indicators are to be used in PAFs, it is important to: identify 
clearly budget support objectives and corruption indicator purpose; develop better outcome, 
rather than output, indicators; support partner country capacity to develop indicators; 
and work towards a comprehensive diagnostic framework for corruption. In general, the 
key message is to clarify the objectives of budget support and the purpose of including 
corruption indicators, and then select indicators that match. Where possible, exploit existing 
anticorruption processes and align PAFs with national anti-corruption processes, if they 
exist.
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